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I. Payment of U.N. Dues
During the 1980s and 1990s, Congress repeatedly withheld payment of dues to the
United Nations, accusing the international organization of being wasteful, mismanaged,
and a threat to U.S. sovereignty.' As a result, the United States amassed a $1.3 billion debt
to the United Nations, representing 65 percent of the total debt owed by Member States.2
After a six-year funding dispute between the United States and the United Nations, U.S.
Ambassador Richard Holbrooke negotiated the first major overhaul of U.N. financing in
more than two decades. 4 He succeeded in cutting U.S. payments to the U.N., diverting
most of the deficit to developing countries with budding economies.
In 1999, the Helms-Biden Act' required that the U.N. accept $926 million in full satisfaction of the U.S. debt, a reduction in the share of the regular U.N. budget from 25 percent

*Michael P. Scharf, Professor of Law and the Director of the Center for International Law and Policy at
New England School of Law, is the Chair of the ABA's International Institutions Committee. Edward Beagan,
Detra Michelle Chandler, Lawrence K. Demeo, Lizabeth R. Fielding, Joao Godoy, and Phillip 0. Figura are
Senior Editors of the New England Internationaland ComparativeLaw Annual.
1. Rob Zone, Finally, U.S. to Pay Off United Nations Debt, THE SEArrLE TMES, Dec. 29, 2000, at B6.
2. Helen Dewar, Debt Payment to U.N. Gains Senate Approval, THE WASH. PosT, Feb. 8, 2001, at Al 7. "[I]n
November 1999, President Clinton signed into law the Helms-Biden Bill (part of the State Department Spending Bill), which authorize[d] $926 million to be paid to the U.N. over three years. Payments thus far have
resulted in a reduction of U.S. arrears to the U.N. from 1.6 billion in 1999, to 1.3 billion by 2001." Michael
P. Scharf et al., InternationalInstitutions, 34 IT'L LAw. 779 (2000).
3. Richard Holbrooke filled the role of U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations from August 1999 toJanuary
19, 2001. Prior to that, in 1995, he played a pivotal role in achieving peace in Bosnia when he gathered Balkan
leaders to an Air Force compound in Dayton, Ohio. The result after three weeks of negotiations was the
Dayton Peace Accord.
4. The last time the U.S. portion of the regular budget was reduced was in 1972, when George Bush was
the ambassador to the U.N. See Edith M. Lederer, GeneralAssembly Adopts Major Overbaul of U.N. Finances,
CH-rrAsNo0A TIMES, Dec. 24, 2000, at A3.
5. The Helms-Biden Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501, 1536 (1999); also known as the "United
Nations Reform Act of 1999," appears in the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations
Authorization Act of 2000-01, Title IX, H.R. 3427 (1999), as contained in the Consolidated Appropriations
Act of 2000 (the State Department Spending Bill) § 1000(a)(7).
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to 22 percent by 2001, and a further reduction to 20 percent by 2002.6 Congress further
required that the United States' share of the peacekeeping budget be reduced from 31
percent to 25 percent by 2001.1 The purpose of the Helms-Biden Act was to compel the
U.N. to revise its scale of assessments by making U.S. payments contingent on U.N. reforms. This unilateral approach, however, fueled anti-American sentiment abroad, thereby
undercutting U.S. influence around the globe and the ability to achieve foreign policy
objectives. In addition, the U.S. non-payment of funds to the U.N. nearly cost the United
States its vote in the General Assembly.'
In an attempt to satisfy the demands of Congress and repair the damage done to America's
image as a world leader, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke spent nearly fourteen months
negotiating a reduction of U.S. dues to the U.N. The agreement Ambassador Holbrooke
negotiated was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 22, 2000. It called
for a decrease in the U.S. share of the U.N. operating budget from 25 percent to 22
percent. 9 Also, the U.S. share of the U.N. peacekeeping costs would drop from 31 percent
to 28 percent in 2001 and to 26 percent in 2003.10 In addition, the General Assembly adopted a more effective budgetary method that will improve the U.N.'s fiscal
accountability."
The greatest obstacle Ambassador Holbrooke faced when negotiating the reductions was
persuading other U.N. Member States to increase their obligations to cover the resulting
budgetary shortfall. He visited each of the U.N. ambassadors to press his cause for reduced
payments to the U.N. and to convince them that the measure was not a subsidy to the
United States.' 2 Rather, Holbrooke argued, such action would strengthen the U.N. by
increasing the participation of all Member States. Holbrooke's negotiating team worked
13
around the clock to close the deal before the General Assembly convened for the year.
The agreement, however, nearly collapsed, as it came too late for many Member States to
include the increased share of the U.N. budget in their already completed national budgets.
This would have resulted in a $34 million budgetary deficit. However, U.S. media magnate
4
Ted Turner saved the agreement thanks to a $34 million contribution.'
6. See id.
7. See id. Congress further required that "[t]he U.N. budget cannot include any growth in spending, even
allowing for inflation." Id.
8. "A member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to
the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the
amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years." U.N. CHARTER, art. 19.
9. See Scale of assessmentsfor the apportionment of the expenses of the U.N., U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Agenda
Item 122, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/5B-F (2000) (adopted without a vote); Scale ofassessmentsfor the apportionment
of the expenses of the U.N., U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 122, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/5A(2000) (adopted
without a vote). See also Fifth Committee Approves Draft Texts on Scale ofAssessments, PeacekeepingFinance,Brahimi
Report Implementation, Sept. 19 to Dec. 22, 2000, U.N. Press Release GA/AB/3425, Dec. 23, 2000. The scale
of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations is based mainly on a nations GNP
and capacity to pay.
10. See Scale of assessmentsfor the apportionmentof expenses of U.N. peacekeepingoperations,U.N. GAOR, 55th
Sess., Agenda Item 169, U.N. Doc. AIRES/55/235 (2000) (adopted without a vote).
11. See Outsourcing Practices,U.N. GAOR 55th Sess., Agenda Item 116, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/232 (2000)
(adopted without vote).
12. Maggie Farley, Holbrooke Leaves U.N. Post Proud ofLegacy Diplomacy: Ambassador Ruffled Some Feathers,
but He Also Raised the Visibility of Key Issues and IncreasedRespect For The U.S., L.A. TiMEs,Jan. 20, 2001, at 12A.
13. The United States was not the only Member State to have its annual payments to the U.N. cut.Japan's
obligation to pay for the U.N. administrative budget was reduced by 1 percent. See Lederer, supra note 4.
14. Known as "The Mouth of the South," Turner began a media empire, which included the Superstation
(TBS) and the Cable News Network (CNN). He also won the America's Cup competition at Newport, R.I.
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The majority of the revenue lost from the reduction in the U.S. obligation to the U.N.
was absorbed by smaller nations with developing economies. For instance, Brazil, South
Korea, and the Persian Gulf states agreed to pay a greater share of the U.N. administrative
and peacekeeping costs.' 5 In addition, the European Union modestly increased its obligation
after some resistance.1 6 Further, China doubled its annual percentage of the U.N. budgets.
And Russia increased its obligation at a time when it would have been able to justify a
decrease in its payments due to its shrinking GDP. 7 In all, eighteen Member States agreed
to increase their obligations to the U.N.
The deal Ambassador Holbrooke negotiated does not completely terminate the U.S.U.N. budgetary controversy. The agreement fell just short of the requirements Congress
set forth in the Helms-Biden Act. Though the reduction of the U.S. share of the U.N.
operating budget satisfied the requirements of the Helms-Biden Act, the reduction of peacekeeping costs will only fall to 26 percent, 1 percent shy of the 25 percent Helms-Biden Act
requirement. Further, the reduction in the peacekeeping budget is not effective until 2003,
two years later than required by the Helms-Biden Act.'" Consequently, because the agreement did not strictly meet the conditions set forth in the Helms-Biden Act, the United
States cannot automatically pay its debt to the U.N. pursuant to the Helms-Biden Act. The
Helms-Biden Act must be amended through the passage of subsequent legislation to allow
for the 25 percent share of the U.N. peacekeeping costs. Only then can the funds be released
to the U.N.
On January 9, 2001, Ambassador Holbrooke was invited to give his final report to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee as Ambassador to the United Nations. 9 In his report,
Ambassador Holbrooke touted that "most of the critical benchmarks outlined by the
Helms-Biden legislation" were achieved. 0 He noted that "[t]he UN is more streamlined,
efficient and effective. [Also, he and his team] helped make its financing more fair and
equitable... [and] worked to restore confidence and trust between the U.S. and the UN."'
Ambassador Holbrooke further noted "[w]hile the problems plaguing UN peacekeeping
are not yet fully solved.., its performance is improving, and the organization is on its way
toward a peacekeeping system that is even more efficient and effective."2 Ambassador Holbrooke closed by stating:
See Lionel Van Derrlin, "Mouth of the South" or "Fillthe (U.N.) Bill,"He's Ted Turner,THE SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIBUNE, Dec. 27, 2000, at B7.
15. See Settling with the U.N. Series: EDITORIALS, ST. PETERSBURG TIMZs, Dec. 30, 2000, at 14-A.
16. The fifteen Member States resisted paying more because it already pays a large portion of the budget.

See id.
17. See id.
18. See The Helms-Biden Act, supra note 5.
19. See Statement for the Record by Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke, United States PermanentRepresentativeto
the United Nations, Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (U.S. Senate, Jan. 9, 2001), available
at http://www.un.int/usa/0lhol0l9.htm. Accompanying Ambassador Holbrooke were Ambassador Jim Cunningham, Ambassador Don Hays, Suzanne Nossel, Mary Ellen Glynn, Bob Orr, Melanie Attwooll, Deborah
Isser and Derek Chollet. Ambassador Holbrooke noted that these people were instrumental in the process of
negotiation in the U.N. reforms. See id.
20. Id. Ambassador Holbrooke noted that "[alchieving reform of the scales has been one of the most arduous
and complex negotiating assignments I have ever confronted. It took an enormous amount of work. In the last
year alone, I had more than 300 meetings with my fellow U.N. Ambassadors on reform-seeing delegations
on this topic literally every working day-and Ambassador Hays and his extraordinarily dedicated team had
well over 500. We made literally thousands of phone calls." Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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If you release the $582 million ... and accept the assessments in the new peacekeeping scale,
I am convinced it will not only strengthen the hand of the incoming Administration, but will
also help Secretary-General Annan in continuing the reform process. I urge you, and other
members of the Congress, to complete this success.23
A bill24 to amend the Helms-Biden Act to allow for the 25 percent share of the U.N.
peacekeeping costs was introduced in the Senate on February 6, 200125 and referred to the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.26 The following day, the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations filed its report with the Senate.27 Later that day, the bill passed without
dissent." The bill was then sent to the U.S. House of Representatives and referred to the
House International Relations Committee, where it is likely to pass.2 9Then, the amendment
must be signed by President George W Bush to become law and release the funds to pay

23. Id.
24. The amendment to the statute includes the following language:
(a) In General. Section 931 (b)(2) of the AdmiralJames W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 (as enacted by section 1000(a)(7) of Public Law 106113 and contained in appendix G of that Act; 113 Stat. 1501A-480) is amended by striking "25
percent" and inserting "28.15 percent."
(b) Conforming Amendment. The undesignated paragraph under the heading "arrearage payments"
in title IV of the Departments of Commerce,Justice, and State, the judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 1999 (as contained in section 101(b) of division A of the Omnibus Consolidated
and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999; 112 Stat. 2681-96) is amended by striking
"25 percent" and inserting "28.15 percent."
See Bill to amend the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 2000 and 2001, to adjust a condition on the payment of arrearages to the United Nations that sets the
maximum share of any United Nations peacekeeping operation's budget that may be assessed of any country.
S. Res. 248 (2001) (passed the Senate without amendment).
25. The bill was introduced in the first session of the 107th Congress and was sponsored by SenatorJessie
Helms (R-NC), and cosponsored by Senator Joseph R Biden, Jr. (D-DE) and Senator John William Warner,
III (R-VA). See 2001 Bill Tracking Report, S. Res. 248, 107th Congress (2001).
26. 144 CONG. REc. 1062 (2001).
27. 147 CONG. REc. 103 (2001).
28. 147 CoNG. REC. 1110 (2001). (Senate began consideration), 147 CONG. REc. 1118 (2001). (Senate passed

by 99 yeas to 0 nays) (vote 10). YEAs: Akaka (HI), Dorgan (ND), Lugar N), Allard (CO), Durbin (IL),
McCain (AZ), Allen (VA), Edwards (NC), McConnell (KY), Baucus (MT), Ensign (NV), Mikulski (MD), Bayh
(IN), Enzi (WY), Miller (GA), Bennett (UT), Feingold (WI), Murkowski (AK), Biden (DE), Feinstein (CA),
Murray (WA), Bingaman (NM), Fitzgerald (IL), Nelson (FL), Bond (MO), Frist (TN), Nelson (NE), Boxer
(CA), Graham (FL), Nickles (OK), Breaux (LA), Gramm (TX), Reed (R1), Brownback (KS), Grassley (IA),
Reid (NV), Bunning (KY), Gregg (NH), Roberts (KS), Bums (MT), Hagel (NE), Rockefeller (WV), Byrd
(WV), Harkin (IA), Santorum (PA), Campbell (CO), Hatch (UT), Sarbanes (MD), Cantwell (WA), Helms
(NC), Schumer (NY), Carnahan (MO), Hollings (SC), Sessions (AL), Carper (DE), Hutchinson (AR), Shelby
(AL), Chafee (RI), Hutchison (TX), Smith (NH), Cleland (GA), Inhofe (OK), Smith (OR), Clinton (NY),
Jeffords (VT), Snowe (ME), Cochran (MS), Johnson (SD), Specter (PA), Collins (ME), Kennedy (MA), Stabenow (MI), Conrad (ND), Kerry (MA), Stevens (AK), Corzine (NJ), Kohl (WI), Thomas (WY), Craig (ID),
Kyl (AZ), Thompson (TN), Crapo (ID), Landrieu (LA), Thurmond (SC), Daschle (SD), Leahy (VT), Torricelli
(NJ), Dayton (MN), Levin (MI), Voinovich (OH), DeWine (OH), Lieberman (CT), Warner (VA), Dodd
(CT), Lincoln (AR), Wellstone (MN), Domenici (NM), Lott (MS), Wyden (OR); Not Voting: Inouye (HI).
See id.
29. See S. Res. 248 (2001). An aide for House International Relations Committee Chairman HenryJ. Hyde
(R-Ill.) said Hyde supports payment of dues to the United Nations but plans to draft his own legislation on
the subject. There is no timetable for House action. See Dewar, supra note 2.
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the U.N.3 ° Given that the major proponents for the Helms-Biden Act appear to be satisfied
with the agreement Ambassador Holbrooke negotiated, the amendment will likely become
law.
The U.N. is an indispensable venue in which to achieve American foreign policy objectives. With the likely passage of legislation amending the Helms-Biden Act, the resulting
goodwill will quell some anti-American sentiment and bolster President George W Bush's
international influence. The U.N. reforms will strengthen the world body by increasing
the participation of all Member States and providing a strong financial base from which it
can efficiently and effectively serve the needs of the global community. Finally, it will prevent Ambassador Holbrooke's successor 3' from facing a growing debt to the U.N. whenever
a new peacekeeping mission is needed.

1I. The Security Council
The Security Council's primary duty is the maintenance of international peace and security. 2 It is composed of five permanent members (the United States, France, Britain,
Russian Federation, China) and ten members elected by the U.N. General Assembly to
two-year terms." Enforcement measures available to the Council include trade embargoes,
freezing of assets, and collective military action, among others.3 4 Three important missions
undertaken by the Security Council in 2000 shed insight on its recent challenges and evolving responsibilities.
A.

SIERRA LEONE

Throughout the 1990s, Sierra Leone was embroiled in a civil war between the internationally recognized government and rebel forces known as the Revolutionary United Front
(RUF).Y Following a 1997 coup that resulted in the exile of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah,
the RUF and other rebel military forces undertook a campaign of atrocities against the
civilian population.3 6 In February 1998, forces acting on behalf of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOMOG) secured control of Freetown, the Sierra Leone
capital, allowing President Kabbah to return."5 Meanwhile, the RUF and other supporters
of the 1997 coup retained control over other areas of the country and continued to engage
in atrocities resulting in the flight of some 200,000 refugees to adjacent nations.' 8
30. Forms of Legislative Business, Enactment of a Law, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/enactment
forms.htnl (last visited Feb 11, 2001). Thomas, an arm of the Library of Congress, is a website dedicated to
Thomas Jefferson's spirit of service providing easy access to plethora of information about the legislative
process. The website also provides tools to track bills as they proceed through the legislative process.
31. Ambassador James B. Cunningham is the Acting United States Permanent Representative to the United
Nations. See United States Mission to the United Nations, About the Mission, available at http://www.un.int/
usa/fact8.htrn (last visited Feb. 11, 2001).
32. See Security Council, Background, at http://www.un.org/documents/scinfo.htn (last modified Oct. 11,
2000).
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. Scan D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 94 AM. J.
INT'L L. 368, 369 (2000).
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 370.
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On July 7, 1999, the Sierra Leone government signed the Lome Peace Agreement with
the RUF, which provided for a cease-fire and the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.9 To replace the existing U.N. observer force (UNOMSIL), in October 1999, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1270 establishing the United
Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), "[t]o cooperate with the Government of
Sierra Leone and the other parties to the Peace Agreement."40 Resolution 1270 provided
for a force of up to 6,000 troops to enforce the Lome Agreement and called upon all rebel
41
parties to disband and surrender their arms.
The pivotal event of the Security Council's involvement in Sierra Leone occurred in May
2000, when rebel forces reneged on the Lome Agreement and captured several hundred
U.N. peacekeepers.42 Deployed into the chaos, the patchwork force from the armies of
developing nations was poorly equipped, had never trained together, and lacked even the
advantage of a common language. 43 Thus, ten months after the U.N. peacekeepers' arrival,
Sierra Leone was plunged back into civil war, with U.N. forces stripped of their own weapons by the RUF, the same group responsible for so many atrocities over the past decade.Although coming too late to prevent the slaughter of civilians and the damage to the U.N.'s
reputation, a highly trained contingent of British troops entered the country, rescued
the hostages, and helped government and regional forces to secure Freetown from RUF
control .41

In subsequent months, the Security Council sought to expand the mandate ofUNAMSIL
and strengthen its ability to provide a credible deterrent to the use of force." Resolution
1313 in August 2000 called for the Secretary-General to procure more support from troopcontributing nations and submit recommendations for strengthening UNAMSIL, "To deter
and, where necessary, decisively counter the threat of RUF attack by responding robustly
to any hostile actions." 47 The Security Council reaffirmed its commitment to providing a
significant military presence in December 2000 through Resolution 1334.48
In addition to beefing up the peacekeeping forces in Sierra Leone, the Security Council
imposed sanctions designed to weaken the RUE Having long recognized that diamond
exports from areas controlled by the RUF were a substantial source of arms funding for
the rebel group, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1306 in July 2000.49 This measure
banned the importation of uncertified diamonds from Sierra Leone, and called upon the
international community to facilitate the Certificate of Origin regime undertaken by the
Sierra Leone government to limit the sale of conflict diamonds. 50

39. Seeid.
40. S.C. Res. 1270, UN SCOR, 54th Sess., 4054th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1270 (1999).
41. Seeid.
42. SeeSecurity Council in PresidentialStatement, Condemns Actions ofRUF in Sierra Leone, Says Foday Sankob
"Must Be Held Accountable," U.N. Press Release SC/6852, May, 4, 2000, available at http://www.un.org/news/
press/docs/2000/20000504.SC6852.doc.html.
43. James Kitfield, Reforming the Blue Helmets, THE NAT'L J., Dec. 23, 2000.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. S.C. Res. 1313, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4184th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1313 (2000).
47. Id.
48. S.C. Res. 1334, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4253rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/334 (2000).
49. S.C. Res. 1306, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4168th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1306 (2000).
50. Id.
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Another cease-fire agreement between the RUF and the government of Sierra Leone
was reached in November 2000 in Abuja, Nigeria." The Security Council continues to
pursue its stated goal of assisting the Sierra Leone government in its efforts to stabilize its
control of certain central territories, while negotiating with the RUF for access to more
remote areas of the country, namely the diamond producing regions.52 However, the problems of inadequate military resources, and the transition of U.N. forces from an observance
role to a credible military threat continue to hamper their efforts to achieve a resolution of
the conflict.53 These resource shortages belie a more fundamental disagreement over the
priority of UNAMSIL among Security Council members.5 4 Such internal debates pose
similar challenges for other Security Council endeavors around the globe.
B.

EAST TIMOR

In 1976, following local power struggles for control over the territory prompted by
Portugal's withdrawal, the Indonesian government declared East Timor its twenty-seventh
province. 5 In 1998, longtime ruler General Suharto resigned amid widespread protest and
economic turmoil, paving the way for the democratic election of a new president, Bj.
Habibie.56 In early 1999, President Habibie approved plans for a referendum to allow the
East Timorese people to choose between special autonomy within Indonesia and independence.57 Subsequently, through Resolution 1236 the U.N. Security Council endorsed an
agreement between Indonesia and Portugal on security arrangements to properly facilitate
the referendum, and approved the deployment of a U.N. civilian police force to supervise
its administration."8
In June 1999, the Security Council further expanded its involvement in the East Timor
referendum through Resolution 1246, creating the United Nations Mission in East Timor
(UNAMET), with a mandate to organize and conduct the independence consultation
scheduled for August 8, 1999.19 In contrast to later U.N. missions in East Timor, which
were authorized to use force, UNAMET was to be comprised of political, electoral and
information components only.60 On August 30, 1999, East Timor's voters overwhelmingly
chose independence over special autonomy.61 In the days that followed, East Timorese
militias opposed to the outcome undertook a campaign of violence, setting fire to dozens
of buildings throughout Dili, the East Timorese capital. This resulted in the deaths of
62
hundreds and a proliferation of refugees numbering in the hundreds of thousands. Effec-

51. See Security Council Extends Mandate of Sierra Leone Mission until March, Unanimously Adopting Resolution

1334 (2000), U.N. Press Release SC/6981, Dec. 22, 2000, available at http://www.un.org/news/press/docs/
2000/sc6981.doc.htn.
52. Id.
53. See S.C. Res. 1270, supra note 40.
54. Kitfield, supra note 43. The five permanent members of the Security Council initially declined to send
their own troops to Sierra Leone.
55. Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practiceof the United States Relating to InternationalLaw, 94 AM. J. INT'i.

L. 102, 105 (2000).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

S.C. Res. 1236, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3998th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1236 (1999).
S.C. Res. 1246, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4013th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1246 (1999).
Id.
See Murphy, supra note 55, at 105.
See id.
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tively undeterred by Indonesian military and police, the militias laid siege to the UNAMET
63
compound, eventually looting it after civilians and U.N. personnel had been evacuated.
On September 15, 1999, the Security Council responded through Resolution 1264, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.- This resolution authorized the "establishment
of a multinational force" to restore peace and security in East Timor "and to facilitate
humanitarian assistance operations," known as INTERFET.6 The Australian-led force,
consisting of 8,000 troops from various member nations, was able to stabilize the situation
and begin the process of returning refugees to East Timor.66 In October 1999, Security
Council Resolution 1272 established the United Nations Transitional Administration in
East Timor (UNTAET) to coordinate with and subsequently replace INTERFET.61Unanimously adopted, this resolution mandated UNTAET to "provide security and maintain
law and order throughout the territory of East Timor," and empowered it to exercise all
legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice. 68 UNTAET was
mandated to administer East Timor for an initial period through January 2001.69
In April 2000, UNTAET reported steady progress toward achieving its mandate, reporting some success toward returning refugees to East Timor, and improved access to
refugee camps in West Timor facilitated by increased flexibility and continuation of aid on
the part of Indonesia. ° The precarious character of the U.N.'s ongoing effort was illustrated
by the September 6, 2000 killing of three UNHCR personnel at a refugee camp in West
Timor.7 Sergio Vieira de Mello, the head of UNTAET emphasized that the Indonesian
military's continuing inability to properly address the threat of militias, was the fundamental
obstacle to the success of UNTAET and the plight of the East Timorese people."
Commentary on the U.N. experience in East Timor suggests that the original agreements
between Indonesia, Portugal, and the U.N. failed to properly plan for security arrangements
necessary to ensure the administration of the popular consultation and a peaceful implementation of the outcome. 3 Though UNAMET was properly charged with the administration of the consultation, that particular mission was poorly equipped to assume the role
of guarantor of security, a mistake that cost many lives and millions of dollars in future
reconstruction efforts. 4 Scholars further criticize the blurred distinctions between the

63. Seeid.
64. S.C. Res. 1264, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4045th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1264 (1999).
65. See id.
66. See Security CouncilBriefed on East Timor by Assistant Secretary-GeneralforPeacekeeping,U.N. Press Release
SC/6776, Dec. 22, 1999, availableat http://www.un.org/news/press/docs/1999/19991222.sc6776.doc.htm.
67. S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4057th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (1999).
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See Assistant Secretary-Generalfor Peacekeeping Briefi Security Council, DescribesMonth of"Steady Progress"
in East Timor, U.N. Press Release SC/6850, Apr. 27, 2000, available at http://www.un.org/news/press/docs/
2000/20000427.sc6850.doc.htrnl.
71. See Militias Root Cause of Problems for UNTAET and Indonesia in East Timor, Secretary-General'sSpecial
Representative Tells Council, U.N. Press Release SC/6928, Sept. 29, 2000, availableat http://www.un.org/news/
press/docs/2000/20000929/sc6928.doc.htnl.
72. Id.
73. Jennifer O'Toole, Comment, A FalseSense of Security, LessonsLearnedfromthe UnitedNationsOrganization
and Conduct Mission in East Timor, 16 Am. U. INT'L L. REV. 199, 242 (2000).
74. Id. at 246.
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U.N.'s traditional role as a sponsor of democratic elections and provider of humanitarian
assistance, and its more recent forays into nation building and employment as a military
force, as illustrated by the evolving U.N. presence in East Timor." Furthermore, the concentration of authority in one international body for humanitarian assistance, security, and6
civil administration represents an unusual, and potentially ill-advised, U.N. intervention.1
C. Kosovo
Following the cessation of the NATO bombing campaign against the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (FRY), the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 on June 10, 1999,
authorizing the NATO-led international civil and security presence in Kosovo." The resolution recognized the principles accepted by the FRY in the agreement reached in Belgrade
in June of 1999, as well as the principles adopted at the May 6, 1999 meeting of the Group
78
of Seven industrialized countries and the Russian Federation. These principles included:
(1) an immediate end to the violence and repression in Kosovo; (2) withdrawal of all Federal
NATO
Republic forces; (3) deployment of international security presence with substantial
79
participation; and (4) the establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo.
The U.N. mission in Kosovo, UNMIK, is unprecedented in scope as well as its integration of external organizations. s0 The Security Council approved KFOR, a NATO-led force,
as the guarantor of security throughout the region.8 ' The mandate to build democratic
institutions was allocated to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE), civil administration to UNMIK, while the European Union assumed responsibility for Kosovo's economic development.82
Unlike East Timor and Sierra Leone, UNMIK benefits from the participation and political support of a broad range of nations, particularly several permanent members of the
Security Council. 3 Also significant is the uncertain status of Kosovo as an independent
84
state, or a territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Resolution 1244 reaffirmed
"the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." 85 At the same time, it renewed the call in previous reso86
lutions for "substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo."
UNM1K itself is intended as an interim arrangement, and is charged with developing local

75. See Kitfield, supra note 43.
76. Ralph Wilde, Recent Developments in the Security Council: Authorizing InternationalAdministrationin Kosovo
and East Timor, Spring 2001 Newsletter of the International Organizations Interest Group of the American
Society of International Law, at 12.
77. S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 401 Ith mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999).
78. See id.
79. See Security Council, Welcoming Yugoslavia's Acceptance of Peace Principles,Authorizes Civil, Security Presence
in Kosovo, U.N. Press Release SC/6686, June 10, 1999, available at http://www.un.org/news/press/docs/1999/
199906 10.sc6686.html.
80. See United Nations, United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), UNMIK
Background,available at http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/unmikl2.html(last visited Jan. 22, 2001).
81. See id.

82. See id.
83.
84.
85.
86.

The Security Council vote on Resolution 1244 was unanimous, although China abstained.
See Wilde, supra note 76.
S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 77.
Id.
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governmental institutions as future heirs of the administrative duties now conducted by
international organizations. 7 Thus, the vexing question of Kosovo's future status continues
to encumber Security Council efforts to achieve a long-term solution to the crisis."8

I. Secretariat Report on U.N. Peace Operations
In March of 2000, the United Nations Secretary-General, Koffi Annan, convened a special panel to conduct a thorough analysis of the United Nation's approach to peacekeeping
and to make recommendations for improvement. 9 This subsection provides a digest of the
panel's report with respect to: (1) prevention and peacemaking, (2) peacekeeping, and
(3) peace-building.
Although peacekeeping is not specifically outlined in the U.N. Charter," such operations
have become a major focus of U.N. activity9' and have become more elaborate since the
end of the cold war.9' The ideal peace operation involves "just two parties, committed to
peace, with competitive but congruent aims, lacking illicit sources of income, with neighbours and patrons committed to peace." 93 Peace operations become more complicated when
there are "three or more parties, of varying commitment to peace, with divergent aims,
with independent sources of income and arms, and with neighbours who are willing to
buy, sell and transit illicit goods."- The end of the cold war has seen an increase in the
number of more complex problems.95 Examples of these problems can be seen in Rwanda,
Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Namibia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Cambodia, Croatia, and
Macedonia.96
According to the special panel, it is vitally important that before the United Nations
begins significant involvement in a peace operation, the United Nations must identify the
complications it is likely to face. 97 Variables to be considered include: (1) identification of
the true motives of the parties; (2) availability of high-priced commodities such as drugs or
jewels; (3) the willingness of neighboring states to traffic in such goods in exchange for
arms; (4) the levels of poverty and corruption in the distribution of resources; (5) political
contests for power; (6) competition for resources; (7) ethnic and religious conflicts; and

87. SeeUNMIK, supra note 80.
88. SeeWilde, supra note 76.
89. SeeU.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 87, U.N. Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809 (2000), available at
http://www.un.org/ga/55/lista55b.htm.
90. See An Introduction to United Nations Peacekeeping, availableathttp://www.un.org/Depts/dpkv/dpka/
intro/index.hon (last visited Oct. 21, 2000).
91. See U.N. Doc.A/5 5/305-S/2000/209,supra note 89, at i. There are fifteen U.N. peacekeeping operations
as of Oct. 1, 2000: UNTSO (Middle East), UNMOGIP (India & Pakistan), UNFICYP (Cyprus), UNDOF
(Middle East), UNIFIL (Lebanon), UNIKOM (Iraq-Kuwait), MINURSO (Western Sahara), UNOMIG
(Georgia), UNMIBH (Bosnia-Herzegovina), UNMOP (Prevlaka), UNMIK (Kosovo), UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone), UNTAET (East Timor), MONUC (the Democratic Republic of the Congo), UNMEE (East Africa).
U.N. Doc. DPI/1634 Rev. 17.
92. See U.N. Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809,supra note 89, at 18.
93. Id. 25.
94. Id.
95. See id. 19.
96. See Blaine Harden, The World: Rule of Force; In Africa, a Lesson in How Not to Keep the Peace, N.Y. TIMES,
May 14, 2000, § 4, at 1.
97. See U.N. Doc. A/551305-S/2000/809,supranote 89, at T 26.
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9s
(8) gross human rights violations. Failure to anticipate these problems in the past has led
9
to parties reneging on their commitments.
With respect to prevention and peacemaking, the special panel stated:

The Panel supports the Secretary-General's more frequent use of fact-finding missions to areas
of tension, and stresses Member States' obligations, under Article 2 (5) of the Charter, to give
"every assistance" to such activities of the United Nations.' °°
These activities are entirely diplomatic and when most successful they are sufficiently low
0
profile to escape notice.' ' Such a low profile does not equate with its level of importance,
however. Prevention is seen as preferable to peacekeeping both in terms of its costs and be02
cause it is naturally better to avoid the damages of war. The major problem in effectively
implementing these strategies is timing. While waiting for a crisis to occur is "too little or
too late," earlier attempts at peacemaking "may be rebuffed by a government that does not3
0
see or will not acknowledge a looming problem, or that may itself be part of the problem.'
Fact-finding missions should help "decide on areas at risk, schedule country (or situation)
review meetings and identify preventive measures" while allowing the U.N. to "accumulate
4
knowledge in a structured way" so that it may plan strategically.'0 This, in turn, would
make it easier for the Secretariat to "persuade Member States of the advantages of backing
'0
their professed commitment to ... conflict prevention."' Meanwhile, holding Member
the
United Nations, "every assisto
provide
Charter
under
the
States to their obligations
tance" would encourage weaker Member States to act without fear that their efforts will be
°6
undermined by a stronger neighbor.'
With respect to peacekeeping, the special panel stated:
[Once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates professionally and successfully and be capable of defending themselves, other mission components
and the mission's mandate, with robust rules of engagement, against those who renege on their
07
commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence.'
According to the special panel, peacekeeping is a necessary step in order to allow peace00
builders to create a self-sustaining peace in the region.' Since the end of the cold war,
peacekeeping operations have evolved from a primarily military model to one with significant civilian elements.'09 Prior peacekeeping operations consisted of a relatively simple and
0
predictable sequence of events: war, cease-fire, monitor, observe, and settle." In the past
ten years, however, these activities have been combined with peace-building, discussed below, and each of these efforts has been subject to increased complications."'
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See id. 9] 22-24.
See id. 21.
Id. T]34.
See id. 15.
See id. 120.
Id. 16.
Seeid.9 31.
Id.
See id. 1 32.
Id. 55.
See id. 28.
See id. 12.
See id. 17.
See id. I 18.
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The panel pointed to the need to avoid situations where a party has given consent to
U.N. peacekeeping only to change the balance of the conflict and not for the legitimate
motive of working toward peace.' In order to accomplish this, the panel indicates that the
[riules of engagement should not limit contingents to stroke-for-stroke responses but should
allow ripostes sufficient to silence a source of deadly fire that is directed at United Nations
troops or at the people they are charged to protect and, in particularly dangerous situations,
should not force United Nations contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers."'
Thus, the impartiality of U.N. operations is not to mean "equal treatment of all parties in
all cases for all time, which can amount to a policy of appeasement,"" 4 but rather adherence
to the principles of the Charter.' The panel expressed the hope that this type of flexibility
in executing the mandate will prevent horrendous outcomes such as the now infamous
genocide in Rwanda.ll6
A side effect of this change in strategy is that larger and more costly forces are needed.,'
Additionally, a willingness on the part of Member States to accept the increased risk of
casualties in assembling a force with real capacity to deter is required.' 1 In order to do this,
it is necessary that Member States be presented with accurate risk analysis and realistic
estimates of the needs for troops." 9
With respect to peace-building, the special panel recommended:
[A] doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police, other rule of law elements and human rights
experts in complex peace operations to reflect an increased focus on strengthening rule of law
institutions and improving respect for human rights in post-conflict environments.
It further recommended:
[T]hat the legislative bodies consider bringing demobilization and reintegration programmes
into the assessed budgets of complex peace operations for the first phase of an operation in
order to facilitate the rapid disassembly of fighting factions and reduce the likelihood of resumed conflict.'20
Finally, the panel recommended that the Executive Committee on Peace and Security "discuss and recommend to the Secretary-General a plan to strengthen the permanent capacity
of the United Nations to develop peace-building strategies and to implement programmes
in support of those strategies."'
Effective peace-building is consistent with the main purpose of the U.N. "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,"' 22 while providing the only effective end to
the mission of peacemaking.'23 This component of peace operations involves the rebuilding

112. See id. 148.

113. Id. 49.
114. Id.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

50.

Seeid.
See id.
See id. 51.
See id. T 52.
See id.

120. Id. 47.
121. Id.
122. Id. 1 1.
123. See id.

29.
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of solid foundations for a long-lasting peace) 24 Peace-building includes: (1) strengthening
the rule of law; (2) reintegrating combatants into civilian society; (3) investigating abuses
of human rights in order to foster a respect for such rights; (4) assisting to ensure a fair
20
election system; (5)supporting a free media; and (6) conflict resolution and reconciliation.
In order to successfully carry out such a mission, the panel outlined several "essential complements to effective peace building" including: fighting corruption, de-mining programs,
and HIV and infectious disease education and control. 2 6 Without effective peace-building,
peacekeeping efforts carry on indefinitely and result in no substantive resolution to the
conflict. 7
These recommendations are meant to (1) allow heads of a mission to immediately establish the credibility of the mission by quickly improving the quality of life in the mission
area through immediate access to funds; (2) foster a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian
police and an approach to upholding the rule of law and respect for human rights;
(3) encourage the reintegration of former combatants in order to prevent recurrence; and
(4) implement a permanent U.N. institution to act as a "focal point for peace building
activities." 2 8
Taken together, these recommendations, if heeded, would yield a peace operations strategy with a more focused goal and more flexible means to achieve that goal. Once implemented, a U.N. force would be able to provide immediate benefits to affected populations
as well as projecting a firm long-term commitment with a credible backing and a clear
consensus of the Member States.
Potential problems also exist, however. The increased threshold for minimum activity
requires an increased investigation into the problems of a potential peacekeeping operation.
It also presents a need for a defined mandate through consensus of all the parties involved,
the allocation of resources for immediate impact in the field, and a reticence toward action
until the Secretary-General can procure commitments for all of the manpower and capital
necessary for the execution of the conflict, this may be so burdensome as to prevent important missions from getting underway promptly.
IV. The International Law Commission
The International Law Commission (ILC) meets in Geneva during the summer of each
year, from May to July, devoting itself to the "codification and progressive development of
international law." 12 9 This U.N. advisory group was established by the General Assembly
in 1947 to initiate the study of international law and make recommendations for advancement. 30 The ILC is composed of thirty-four experts, each of which are nominated by their
own individual government, and elected by the U.N. General Assembly, for a term of five
years to represent the world's primary and principle legal systems."' These experts are

124. Seeid. 44.
125. Seeid.
126. Seeid.
127. Seeid.
128. See id. 9 7.
129. The InternationalLaw Commission, availableat http://www.geneva.ch/ILC.htn ast visited Nov. 8,2000i
[hereinafter The InternationalLaw Commission].
130. Stephen Mccaffrey, It Codification in Decline?, 20 HASTINGS INT'L &Comp. L. REv. 639, 640 (1997).
131. See The InternationalLaw Commission, supra note 129, at 1.
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expected to represent themselves personally and individually for the good of the U.N.,
rather than represent the interests or positions of their respective governments.132
The ILC's plan of work is derived from recommendations of the U.N. General Assembly.
It drafts treaties and other instruments of codification or progressive development in areas
where international law is not sufficiently clear. "' Since last year's update in The International Lawyer, the ILC held its fifty-first and fifty-second Sessions. The projects that were
considered by the ILC at these sessions included international state responsibility, reservations to treaties, international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not
prohibited by international law, and crimes against the peace and security of mankind.134
A.

INTERNATIONAL STATE RESPONSIBILITY

For a number of years, the ILC has been working on Draft Articles on State Responsibility. The current Special Rapporteur in charge of the project is ProfessorJames Crawford
of Cambridge University. Historically, "the term 'state responsibility' had been linked to
the obligations of a state to observe international law standards governing the treatment of
nationals of another state."' 35 Subsequently, the term has been broadened to mean liability
36
for breach of any obligation owed to another state.
In both the fifty-first and fifty-second sessions, the ILC continued consideration of certain of the more controversial articles and referred them to the Drafting Committee. The
fifty-first session dealt with breach of an international obligation, implication of a State in
the internationally wrongful act of another State, and circumstances precluding wrongfulness.'37 The fifty-second session contained proposals for legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act of a State, and also for the implementation of State Responsibility
as well as cleaning up the general provisions section of the draft articles.13
The ILC continued to defer the question of the ultimate form the Draft Articles on State
Responsibility should take. The Draft Articles could be promulgated as a Convention for
ratification by States, consistent with the past projects of the ILC. The ratification process
would take years, however, and many States might never ratify the Convention. Another option under consideration is to promulgate the Draft Articles as adeclarative statement (similar
to a restatement) that could be immediately influential as a codification of existing law. 1 9
132. See Mccaffrey, supra note 130, at 1.
133. The InternationalLaw Commission, available at http://www.itu.ch/MISSIONS/US/bb/ilc.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2000). "The ILC's work has provided the foundations for such treaties as the 1973 Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic
Agents; the 1975 Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in Their Relations with International
Organizations of a Universal Character; the 1978 Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in Respect
of State Property, Archives and Debts; and the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States
and International Organizations or between International Organizations." Id.
134. Ben Chigara, The InternationalTribunalfor the Law of the Sea and Customary InternationalLaw, 22 Lov.
INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 433, 450 (2000).

135.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT

§ 206, pt. 2,

ch. 1 (1987).
136. Id.
137. InternationalLaw Commission, Summary of the Commission's Work Done at its Fifty-first Session, at http://
www.un.org/law/ilc/sessions/51/5 lsess.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2000) [hereinafter Summary 511.
138. International Law Commission, Summary of the Commission's Work at its Fifty-second Session, at http://
www.un.org/law/ilc/sessions/52/52sess.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2000) [hereinafter Summary 521.
139. See id.
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RESERVATIONS TO TREATIES

In its fifty-first session, the ILC continued its work on Reservations to Treaties, under
the Chairmanship of Special Rapporteur Alain Pellet of France. Because the ILC has previously drafted Conventions that govern treaty reservations, the current project aims to
produce a Guide to Practice. The Guide to Practice would aid governments and international organizations in dealing with reservations to treaties and in complying with the reservations provisions in the existing conventions.140 At its fifty-first session, the ILC adopted
twenty draft guidelines on first reading. In its fifty-second session, the ILC adopted five
additional draft guidelines "pertaining to reservations made under exclusionary clauses,
unilateral statements made under an optional clause, unilateral statements providing for a
choice between the provisions of a treaty and alternatives to reservations and interpretative
declarations.'

41

C. INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY FOR INJURIOUS CONSEQUENCES

At its fifty-first session, the ILC decided to defer consideration of the topic of interna-

tional liability pending the second reading of the draft articles on the prevention of trans142
boundary damage from hazardous activities. At its fifty-second session, the ILC estab-

lished a Working Group to examine the comments and observations made by States on the
draft articles with respect to the sub-topic of prevention, which had been adopted on first
reading by the ILC in 1998.141
On the basis of the discussion in the Working Group, the Special Rapporteur presented
the third report, containing a draft preamble and a revised set of draft articles on prevention,
along with the recommendation that they be adopted as a framework convention. Furthermore, the third report addressed questions such as the scope of the topic, its relationship
with liability, the relationship between an equitable balance of interests among States concerned and the duty of prevention, as well as the duality of the regimes of liability and state
responsibility. The ILC considered the report and decided to refer the draft preamble and
*

draft articles on prevention to the Drafting Committee. 4

D.

UNILATERAL ACTS OF STATES

In its fifty-first session, the ILC discussed the introduction of a new topic, "the Unilateral
Acts of States," which it defined as:
A unilateral statement by a State by which such State intends to produce legal effects in its
and which is notified or otherwise
relations to one or more States or international organizations
14
made known to the State or organization concerned.

See Summary 5l, supra note 137, at 4.
See Summary 52, supra note 138, at 3.
See Chigara, supra note 134, at 2.
See Summary 51, supranote 137, at 4.
See id.
145. Id.

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

SUMMER 2001

776

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

The ILC began a basic study of the topic with a goal to the eventual promulgation of draft
articles.146 To this end, the Secretary of the ILC sent out questionnaires to Governments
147
"inquiring about their practice and position concerning certain aspects of unilateral acts."'
At its fifty-second session, the ILC continued to examine the topic and began to create
proposals for draft articles dealing with unilateral acts. The session also created a Working
Group to combine answers from questionnaires sent out the previous year in the fifty-first
48

session. 1

The work of the ILC is often cited in international and domestic cases. The Commission's work has been particularly useful in areas of the law where there is a paucity of
precedent and scholarship. It is a well-founded resource, supported by the U.N. where
intellectual and creative ideas on international law are proposed, discussed and codified by
the foremost experts in the field. The record, reports and work product of the ILC are
accessible on the Internet and can be found in further detail on the U.N. website, Analytical
Guide to the Work of the International Law Commission. 1-9
V. The International Court of Justice
There have been several major developments in the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
during the last year. Of the twenty-five active cases before the Court, two have been submitted for deliberation - The LaGrandCase (Germany v. United States) and Maritime Delimitation & TerritorialQuestions between Qatarand Bahrain (Qatarv. Bahrain).The remaining twenty-three cases pending have been addressed with respect to various pre-adjudication
and post-adjudication procedural issues. The Court also addressed questions ofjurisdiction
and admissibility in several of the cases.
A.

NEW COMPOSITION OF THE COURT

On February 7, 2000, the ICJ designated Judges Gilbert Guillaume and Shi Jiuyong to
serve as president and vice president, respectively. 50 Each is to serve in the position for a
term of three years. In an election held on March 2, 2000, Thomas Buergenthal 5' of the
United States was elected to fill the vacant seat left by the resignation of Judge Stephen M.
Schwebel. The Court also elected a new registrar, Philippe Couvreur of Belgium, to fill
the vacancy left by the resignation of Mr. Valencia-Ospina." 2 The new registrar, elected on
February 10, 2000, will hold the position for a term of seven years.

146. See Summary 51, supra note 137, at 3.
147. Id.
148. See Summary 52, supra note 138, at 3.
149. The guide has been prepared by The Codification Division of the Office of Legal Affairs. This guide

was created to be used by researchers and academics for examination of the Commission's ongoing recommendations and advancements in international law, available athttp://www.un.org/law/ilc/guide/guide.htm.
150. See Report of the International Court of Justice, Aug.l, 1999-July 31, 2000, at http://www.icj-cij.org/
icjwww/igeneralinformation/igeninf/ICJAnnual_Report_ 1999-2000.htm (last visitedJan. 182001) [hereinafter
Report of the International Court ofJusticel.
151. For a complete biography on Thomas Buergenthal and other members of the court, visit http://
www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation.htm.
152. See Report of the International Court of Justice, supra note 150, at 3.
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AND HONDURAS IN THE CARIBBEAN SEA

HONDURAS)

The root of the dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras stems from the Arbitral Award
by His Majesty the King of Spain on December 23, 1906.'" Nicaragua filed an Application
before the Court to settle the issue of the actual maritime border in the Caribbean Sea, the
continental shelf, and exclusive economic zone between Nicaragua and Honduras.11 In an
order dated March 21, 2000, the Court fixed the time limits for the filing of the initial
written pleadings by the parties."
C.

ARMED ACTIVITIES ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CONGO (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO V UGANDA)

In June 1993, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) instituted proceedings
against the Republic of Uganda in respect of a dispute concerning "acts of armed aggression
perpetrated by Uganda on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and of the Charter of the Organization of
massive human
African Unity." 5 6 The DRC contends that the armed aggression involved
57
rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law.
On July 1, 2000, the Court granted the DRC's request for the indication of provisional
measures. The Court ordered the parties to refrain from any armed activities that would
prejudice the rights of the other party, "aggravate or extend the dispute or make it more
difficult to resolve.""' The Court also provided that the parties must take all measures
necessary to comply with their obligations under international law, and to ensure full respect
within the zone of conflict for fundamental human rights and for the applicable provisions
of humanitarian law.' 59
D.

SOVEREIGNTY OVER PuLAu LIGITAN AND PULAU SIPADAN (INDONESIA V MALAYSIA)

In 1998, Indonesia and Malaysia jointly filed an application before the Court to determine
whether sovereignty over the islands of Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipidan belongs to Malaysia
or the Republic of Indonesia.16 ° By Order of May 12, 2000, the Court extended the time
limits for the filing of a Memorial by both parties and, on October 20, 2000, the Court
161
fixed the time limit for the filing of a Reply by each of the parties.

153.
(Order
154.
155.

Maritime Delimitation Between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicar. v. Hond.)
of Mar. 21, 2000), available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
See id.
See id.

156. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda) (Order of July 1, 2000), availabe
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157. See id.
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APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT
OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE (CROATIA V YuGOsLAvIA)

On July 2, 1999, Croatia instituted a proceeding before the Court alleging that the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had violated the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide between 1991 and 1995. With respect to this case,
Croatia recently requested an extension of the time limit for the filing of its Memorial,
initially set for March 14, 2000.162 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not oppose the
request with the understanding that if the extension for Croatia were granted, Yugoslavia
would request a reciprocal extension for the filing of its Counter-Memorial. ' 63The Court
granted both extensions on June 27, 2000.164
F.

AERIAL INCIDENT OF 10 AUGUST 1999 (PAKISTAN V INDIA)

On June 21, 2000, the Court declared that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute
filed by the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The Court refused jurisdiction on three grounds.
First, it found that India had never agreed to be bound by the General Act for Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes of 1928.165 Article 17 of this Act requires that all
disputes between its signatories be settled by the International Court ofJustice. The Court
based its conclusion on a communication to the U.N. Secretary-General on September 18,
1974, in which India stated "[t]he Government of India never regarded [itself] as bound by
the General Act of 1928 since [its] Independence in 1947. '"66 Second, the Court held that
it had no jurisdiction on the basis of the declarations made by the parties accepting the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. The Court noted that while India had accepted the
Court's jurisdiction through its declaration of 1974, it did so with an express reservation
excluding jurisdiction over "disputes with the government of any State which is or has been
a Member of the Commonwealth of Nations."' 67 The Court rejected Pakistan's arguments
that this "Commonwealth reservation" is "extra-statutory" or obsolete.16 The Court
stressed that its jurisdiction exists only within the limits with which it has been accepted
and, as such, it may be reserved by the States.' 9 Finally, the Court simply refused to accept

Pakistan's third basis for asserting jurisdiction over the dispute. The Court held that there
is no specific provision in the United Nations Charter conferring compulsory jurisdiction
on the Court.Y°

162. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croat.

v. Yugoslavia) (Order ofJune 27, 2000), available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999, Press Communiqu6 2000/19 (Pak. v. India) (June 21, 2000), available
at http://www.icj-cij.org [hereinafter Aerial Incident].
166. Case Concerning the Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999, Press Communiqu6 2000/19bis (Pak. v. India)
(June 21, 2000), availableat http://www.icj-cij.org.
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LAGRAND CASE (GERMANY V UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

In 1982, Karl and Walter LaGrand, both German nationals, were detained by authorities
of the State of Arizona. The two were subsequently tried and sentenced to death. Germany
contends that the United States failed to inform the LaGrands of their rights to consular
assistance as required under Article 36, subparagraph l(b), of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations."' Germany asserted that this failure prevented it from protecting its
national's interests. In 1999, Arizona's office of State Attorney admitted that it had been
aware of the detainees' status as German nationals since 1982, despite its earlier denials.
When the LaGrands were finally able to seek consular assistance in 1992, after exhausting
their remedies at the state level, their claims for violations of the Vienna Convention were
denied by the federal district court based upon the doctrine of procedural default.,72 The
federal court held that because they had not previously raised the question regarding their
rights under the Vienna Convention in the state courts, they were precluded from doing
so in their federal petition for habeas corpus.' 73 Karl LaGrand was executed by the State of
Arizona on February 24, 1999.114 Walter LaGrand was executed on March 3, 1999, the
same day that the ICJ issued an order directing the United States to "take all measures at
its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand was not executed pending the final decision of
the International Court of Justice on the matter."'
On November 17, 2000, the public hearings on the merits of this case were concluded
and the case was submitted to the ICJ for judgment. The Federal Republic of Germany
seeks a declaration that the United States: (1) violated its international legal obligations to
Germany under Articles 5 and 36, paragraph 1 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations when it failed to inform Karl and Walter LaGrand of their rights under the
Convention without delay; 7 6 (2) violated its international legal obligation to Germany under Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Vienna Convention by applying the doctrine of procedural
default, a rule of its domestic law, and preventing the LaGrands from raising their claims
under the same Convention; 77 and (3) violated its international legal obligations to comply
with the International Court of Justice's Order on Provisional Measures by failing to take
all measures to ensure that Walter LaGrand was not executed. 7 1 Should the Court find in
favor of the Republic of Germany, Germany seeks an assurance from the United States that
it will not repeat its unlawful acts, and in the future, will ensure the effective exercise of
the rights under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention in all cases involving German nationals." 79 The United States seeks a declaration that it has acknowledged that there was
indeed a breach of the United States' obligation to Germany under Article 36(1)(b) in that

171. SeeLaGrand Case Order, (F.R.G. v. U.S.) (Judgment of Nov. 17, 2000), available at http://www.icjcij.org.
172. See Application, Instituting Proceedings, LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.) (Mar. 2, 1999), available at

http://www.icj-cij.org.
173. Seeid.
174. See id.
175. LaGrand Case, Press Communiqu6 2000/38 (F.R.G. v. U.S.) (Nov. 17, 2000), available at http:/i
www.icj-cij.org.
176. Seeid.

177. See id.
178. Seeid.
179. See id.
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the appropriate authorities did not promptly inform the LaGrands of their rights under the
Convention.8 0 The United States also seeks a declaration that it has apologized to Germany
and "is taking substantial measures aimed at preventing any recurrence."'' Finally, the
United States seeks a dismissal of all other claims182
H.

MARITIME DELIMITATION AND TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS BETWEEN QATAR AND BAHRAIN
(QATAR

V BAHRAIN)

The ICJ commenced hearings on the merits of this dispute to determine the sovereignty
over the Hawar Islands, sovereign rights over the shoals of Dibal and Qit'atJarada, and the
delimitation of the maritime areas between Bahrain and Qatar on May 29, 2000.13 The
public hearings were concluded on June 29, 2000. In its submissions, Qatar seeks a declaration that (1) it is sovereign over the Hawar Islands and the shoals of Dibal and Qit'at
Jaradah; (2) Bahrain has no sovereignty over the island of Janan or Zubarah; and (3) the
maritime boundary between the two states should be drawn on the basis that Qatar is
sovereign over Zubarah, the Hawar Islands, and the island of Janan. s4 Bahrain seeks a
declaration that it is sovereign over Zubarah and the Hawar Islands.185
I.

LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (YUGOSLAVIA

v BELGIUM) (YUGOSLAVIA

(YUGOSLAVIA

V FRANCE) (YUGOSLAVIA

(YUGOSLAVIA

v NETHERLANDS) (YUGOSLAVIA

V GERMANY)

(YUGOSLAVIA

V PORTUGAL)

V CANADA)

V ITALY)

(YUGOSLAVIA

V

UNITED KNGDOM)

In its application instituting proceedings before the ICJ, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia charges that each of the Respondent states violated its international obligations:
(1) banning the use of force against another State; (2) not to intervene in the internal affairs
of another State; (3) not to violate the sovereignty of another State; (4) to protect the civilian
population and civilian objects in wartime; (5) to protect the environment; (6) to free navigation on international rivers; (7) regarding fundamental human rights and freedoms;
(8) not to use prohibited weapons; and (9) their obligations to not deliberately inflict conditions of life calculated to cause the physical destruction of a national group.8 6 In an order
dated September 8, 2000, the Court fixed a time limit of April 5, 2001, for Yugoslavia to
submit its written statements on the preliminary objections raised by the eight respondent
states.'

180. Seeid.
181. Id.
182. See id.
183. Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Press Communiqu6
2000/13 (Qatar v. Bahr.) (Apr. 14, 2000), available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
184. See Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Press Communique
2000/122 (Qatar v. Bahr.) (June 29, 2000), available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
185. Seeid.
186. See Application Instituting Proceedings, Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belg.) (Apr. 29, 1999),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
187. See Case Concerning Legality of Use of Force Order (Yugoslavia v. Belg.) (Sept. 8, 2000), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org.

VOL. 35, NO. 2

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
J.

781

OIL PLATFORMS ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN V UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

In this dispute, Iran alleges that the United States breached various provisions of the
Treaty of Amity and customs of international law.' The allegations stem from the destruction of three offshore oil production complexes owned by the National Iranian Oil Company. Iran claims that the damage was caused by several U.S. naval warships on October
19, 1987 and April 18, 1988. I89 In September 2000, at the request of the United States, the
Court extended the time limit for the filing of a Rejoinder by the United States for four
months.'90
K.

AHmAho

S imo DIALLO (REPUBLIC OF GUINEA v DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

OF THE CONGO)

The Court extended the time limit for the filing of written pleadings to September 8,
2000. Ahmadou Diallo, a Guinean national, was "unlawfully imprisoned by the authorities
of [Democratic Republic of Congo]," divested of his property, and then expelled when he
tried to recover money owed to him by the DRC and by companies operating within that
country.' 91 At the time of his detention, Diallo had been a resident of the DRC for thirtytwo years. 92 The Republic of Guinea filed an "Application with a view to diplomatic protection" seeking the Court to "condemn the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the
grave breaches of international law perpetrated upon the person of a Guinean national."' 93
L.

CASE CONCERNING ARMED ACTIVITIES ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CONGO
(DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO V BURUNDI) (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO V RWANDA)

In these sister cases, the Democratic Republic of the Congo filed an Application in the
Registry of the Court against Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda for alleged "acts of armed
aggression perpetrated by Burundi [Rwanda and Uganda] on the territory of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and of the
Charter of the Organization of African Unity."' 194 In the cases of Burundi and Rwanda, each
respectively advised the Court of its intent to raise preliminary objections to the Court's
jurisdiction and the admissibility of the Applications.19 In an order dated October 19, 2000,
the Court extended the time for the Democratic Republic of the Congo to file its Counter96
Memorials.
188. See Oil Platforms, Press Communiqu6 2000/26 (Iran v. U.S.) (Sept. 8,2000), availableat http://www.icj-

cij.org.
189. Seeid.
190. Seeid.
191. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, Press Communiqu6 2000/28 (Guinea v. Congo) (Sept. 13, 2000), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org.
192. Seeid.
193. SeeReport of the International Court of Justice, Aug.1, 1999-July 31, 2000, at 51, available at http://

www.icj-cij.org.
194. Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, Order (Congo v. Burundi) (Oct.
19, 2000), available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
195. SeeArmed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, Press Release 2000/34 (D.R.C. v. Burundi) (Congo
v. Rwanda) (Oct. 20, 2000), available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
196. Seesupra note 194.
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QUESTIONS OF INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE

1971

MONTREAL

CONVENTION ARISING FROM THE AERIAL INCIDENT AT LOCKERBIE (LIBYAN ARAB
JAMAHIRIYA

v UNITED KINGDOM) (LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA V UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA)

This case arose from the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in
1988.191 The only new development in this case was the fixing of time limits for the filing
of Rejoinders by the United Kingdom and the United States by orders dated September 6,
2000.198

N.

ARREST WARRANT OF ii

APRIL 2000 (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

OF THE CONGO V BELGIUM)

In its last judicial act of the year, the Court rejected Belgium's request that the case
concerning the arrest warrant be removed from the list. The arrest warrant in question was
issued by a Belgian investigating judge against the Democratic Republic of the Congo's
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi. 199 The acts that constituted
the basis for the warrant occurred during the period when the Democratic Republic of the
Congo was battling a military rebellion and an invasion by Rwandan, Ugandan, and Burundian troops.3° The warrant asserts that Ndombasi, while acting as Principal Private
Secretary to the president of the Republic, made televised statements inciting the continued
massacre and persecution of Tutsi civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 0'
The DRC instituted proceedings against the Kingdom of Belgium for a violation of the
principle that a State may not exercise its authority on the territory of another State, the
principle of sovereign equality, and the diplomatic immunity of the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of a sovereign State. 0 Belgium requested that the case be removed from the court's
list due to a change in the Cabinet in the DRC 53° Ndombasi is no longer the Minister of
Foreign Affairs; he now occupies the office of Minister of Education. °4 Belgium asserts
that the cabinet reshuffle has made the Congo's Application moot. 05 The Court rejected
this argument on the grounds that "the arrest warrant continues to be in the name of Mr.
Yerodia Ndombasi and the Congo contends that he continues to enjoy immunities which
6
render the arrest warrant unlawful."20

197. See Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie, Press Communiqu6 2000/27 (Libya v. U.K.) (Sept. 13, 2000), availableat http://

www.icj-cij.org.
198. See Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention
arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie, Order (Libya v. U.K.) (Libya v. U.S.) (Sept. 6, 2000), available
at http://www.icj-cij.org.
199. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, Press Release 2000/140 (Congo v. Belg.) (Dec. 8, 2000), available
at http://www.icj-cij.org.
200. See Application Instituting Proceedings, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belgium) (Oct. 17,
2000), at 5, available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
201. See id.
202. See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, Order (Congo v. Belg.) (Dec. 8, 2000),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org.
203. See supra note 200.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. Id.
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VI. International Financial Institutions: World Bank
and IMF
During the week of November 29, 1999, three thousand trade officials from more than
07
100 countries gathered in the Washington State Convention and Trade Center in Seattle
2°s
to discuss for four days how to bring the world economy even closer. Instead of a peaceful
meeting where debates about globalization, finance, working conditions in developing
countries, and e-commerces0 9 among other topics, were going to take place, the United
210
States witnessed something only comparable to rallies during the Vietnam War era. Fully
21
geared, helmeted police and armored vehicles battled extremely violent protestors ' who
threw the World Trade Organization conference into chaos, causing what was perhaps one
of the nation's worst urban riots in decades.21 2In the eye of the hurricane were the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
A. THE

WORLD

BANK

The World Bank was originally created 2 3 to provide financial assistance to countries that
had been devastated by World War 1I, and subsequently, to help countries from the Third
World develop a strong economy. 214 But, according to critics of the World Bank, some of
its policies have brought very little progress and development to the countries it was supposed to serve. 213 For example, people still live in extreme poverty in countries in Africa
and Latin America despite the billions of dollars the World Bank has lent to these countries
over the last five decades.216
207. See Countdown to Chaos in Seattle, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 5, 1999.
208. See John Burgess, WITO to Meet as ProtestersRally Forces;Trade Talks to Open Without an Agenda, WASH.
POST, Nov. 29, 1999, at AO1.
209. See Joe Carroll,"Battleof Seattle" Threatens WTO summit, THE IRish TIMES, Nov. 30, 1999.
210. See Sally MacDonald, Peace Activists Struggle with Feelings This Time, THE SEATTLE TIMES, April 18,
1999.
211. See The Real Losers, THE EcoNoMisT, Dec. 11, 1999, at 15. "The protesters, composed of the environmentalists, the trade unionists, some anarchists, and many globaphobics opposed to globalization, may have
been successful in disrupting the WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle and preventing the Ninth Round
from becoming organized, but the question remains as to who the real losers were in this Battle of Seattle.
The protesters fought ostensibly to protect the developing nations, the so-called victims of free trade, which
are coincidentally the major violators of environmental standards and perpetrators of poor labor standards.
There is no doubt that some multinational corporations use these victims and violators to their financial
advantage in the name of "free trade" and in compliance with their corporate duty of profit maximization.
However, if globalization were to be pushed sharply backwards, it is precisely the developing nations and the
poor who would lose."
212. See Joseph Kahn, Seattle ProtestorsAre Back With a New Target, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 9, 2000, at 4 (noting
that the protestors are now focusing their attack on the IMF and the World Bank, and it is estimated that
10,000 to 30,000 people will join the weeldong demonstration in Washington, D.C., in April, 2000).
213. See Susan Tiefenbrun, Free Trade and Protectionism: The Semiotics of Seattle, 17 ARiz. J. Io-r'L & COMP.
L. 257, 260 (2000).
214. See Shelley Wright, Women and the Global Economic Order: A FeministPerspective, 10 AM. U. J. I T'L L.
&PoL. 861, 878 (1995).
215. See James M. Cooper, Essay: Access toJustice 1.1, 30 CAL. W. INr'L LJ. 429 (2000).
216. See Mark Weisbrot, Perspective on Global Economy; We Need More World anda Lot Less Bank; World Bank
and IMF PoliciesHave Failedthe Poor, The Environment andParticipatingNations, L.A. TiMEs, July 6, 2000, at 11.
Yet their record on economic growth is their most spectacular failure. Over the last 20 years, low- and
middle-income countries throughout the world have implemented the economic policies of the World
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"We live in a world scarred by inequality," World Bank PresidentJames D. Wolfensohn
recently stated. "Something is wrong when the richest 20 percent of the global population
receive more than 80 percent of the global income.., and when 2.8 billion people still live
on less than $2 a day."' 2' 7 One might wonder if it is time for a change.'"
Among the most important issues facing the World Bank in this new millennium is
globalization. Supporters of this process assert that while there has been some inequality
between countries that increased in recent decades, globalization is still an effective vehicle
for achieving global economic growth and prosperity.2 9 Its critics argue that globalization
is only widening the gap between rich and poor 220 while serving the developmental purposes
of the richest countries, and giving very little to the real development of the poorest
2
countries? '
Recent economic crises and market instability, along with rising criticism from civil
society, as seen in hundreds of demonstrations around the world, have underscored the
need to continue to examine globalization from a number of different perspectives. 22Joe
Stiglitz, the outspoken former chief economist at World Bank, recently remarked, "globalization was not a win-win project. Hard choices and trade-offs between winners and losers
23
remained."
As the world economic structure has been changing profoundly during the last five years,
so has the World Bank. Behind the intricate language of academic economics at the World
Bank, there is a battle over its intellectual agenda.224 This battle has provoked tensions and

Bank and the IMF, often under the threat of economic strangulation. The worst disaster has been in
Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union, which lost more than 40% of their national income
in the 1990s. This is worse than our own Great Depression. Income per person in sub-Saharan Africa
has declined about 20% over the last 20 years. In Latin America, it has barely grown-maybe 7% over
the whole two decades. By contrast, both of these regions showed vastly superior economic growth
in the previous two decades, before the IMF and World Bank's 'structural adjustment' policies became
the norm. From 1960 to 1980, income per person grew 34% in Africa and 73 % in Latin America. The
only region that has grown rapidly over the last 20 years has been South and East Asia. But this region
had similarly rapid growth in the previous two decades. And these are the countries that have most
disregarded Washington's instructions. China, which quadrupled its national income over the last 20
years, does not even have a convertible currency. In short, there is no region in the world that the
bank and the IMF can claim as a success story, while their failures have been widespread and devastating.
That is why their top officials, when pressed to defend their policies, will point to an individual country's
economy over a relatively short period of time.
Id.
217. William Drozdiak & Steven Pearlstein, ProtestersParalyze Prague;IMF, World Bank Once Again Target
of Anti-GlobalizationMovement, THE WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2000, at A16.
218. See generally James M. Cooper, More Democracyfor Globalization, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIR., Apr. 21,
2000.
219. See Sleepless in Seattle; The Pressure Will beon the WTO: Rightly, THE GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 27,
1999.
220. See Charlotte Denny, Brown Defends Monetary Giants: Cooperation 'is Way Forward to BeatPoverty', THE
GUARDIAN

(London), Sept. 21, 2000.

221. See Richard Douthwaite, According to World Bank Experts, this Equation Helps Prove that When the Rich
get Rich, the Poor Get Rich, THE GUARDIAN (London), June 14, 2000.
222. See Making the Global Economy Work for Everyone: Challenges and Opportunities, available at http:!!
www.amp2000.cz/meeting.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2000).
223. Id.
224. See Alan Beattie, World Bank Stages IntellectualBattle Over Globalisation,FIN. TIMES (London)June 30,
2000, at 5.
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225
some high-profile resignations within the World Bank. The Bank said that the war on
poverty needed a broader approach than previously thought, and changes were made to the
newly released World Development Report (WDR) to place a stronger emphasis on
growth 2 6 The WDR has been the subject of intense interest from development charities
27
and governments since its first author, the academic economist Ravi Kanbur, resigned in
2
June. ' Perhaps the slogan of the protesters who gathered outside the World Bank last
April might represent what critics say should be the new era of the World Bank: "More
World, Less Bank."229

B.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

While some developing countries have made impressive progress in raising living standards in recent decades, too many countries, and nearly one-fifth of the world's population,
have regressed in relative and sometimes absolute terms. This is arguably one of the greatest
economic failures of the twentieth century.230
In a scene that has become very common during international financial institution meetings, on September 26, 2000, in the Czech capital, Prague, about 8,000 activists were
protesting against the inequities of economic globalization, during the annual meeting of
the IMF"' Delegates found themselves trapped for twelve hours inside a downtown con232
vention center as demonstrators blocked all exit routes. This common scene reflects more
and more feelings of resentment against the IMF, which has been accused of spoiling the
environment, propping up dictators, and aggravating disparities between rich and poor
233
nations.
Some say that "the real news from Prague was not the street protests but the IMF's
234
commitment to reform, a continuation of its evolution over the last year." At the Prague
emphasized
Horst
Koehler
meeting's closing press conference, IMF Managing Director

225. See Anthony Rowley, Wolfensohn's Grand Plan for World Growth, Bus. TIMES (Singapore), Sept. 22,
2000, at 12.
226. See id.
227. See Weisbrot, supra note 216. "Ravi Kanbur, the Cornell University economist who was lead author
of the World Bank's influential 2000 World Development Report. Kanbur quit because he came under pressure, reportedly from the U.S. Treasury Department, to alter the manuscript so that it would conform to the
IMF/World Bank/Treasury's orthodoxy on globalization." Id.
228. See Reduce Inequality, Says World Bank, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 13, 2000, at 14.
229. See John Vidal, CarnivalistasSlink in with a Pink Revolution: Yorkshire Women Bring Post-Marxist Economics, Zapatista-Style, to Prague to Shake the Summit Meeting of the World Bank and IMF, THE GUARDIAN
(London), Sept. 23, 2000. "How they will communicate in Prague is uncertain, but they are boning up on such
useful phrases as 'Zruste treti svetovy dluh' (Cancel third world debt), 'Vice lepsiho sveta, mena bank' (more
world, less bank), 'Nikdyse nevzdame!' (We'll never surrender) and 'Vzdavame Se!' (We surrender)." Id.
230. Transcript: International Monetary Fund Press Conference on World Economic Outlook (Apr. 12,
2000), available at http://www.imf.org/externalnp/tr/2000/trOO0412.htn.
231. See Cathy Young, The Fuzzy Goals of Antiglobalization Activists, THE BosToN GLOBE, Oct. 1, 2000,

at E7.
232. See Francis Harris, We've Won, Say PragueProtesters:The IMF and World Bank Meeting Ends a Day Early
TELEGRAPH (London), Sept. 28, 2000.
After Violence in the Czech Capital,THE DMALY
233. See Drozdiak & Pearlstein, supra note 217.
234. Adam Lerrick and Allan Meltzer, Slow Progress in Prague: The IMF Is Moving in the Right Directionbut
the World Bank Is Still in a Muddle, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 10, 2000, at 19.
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the renewed cooperation between the Bretton-Woods twins on major global issues,"' and
the IMF concentration on strengthening and restructuring the international financial structure, and helping to prevent financial crises.2 6 Another sign of the IMF's reform was the
November 1999 resignation of Michel Camdessus, who ran the IMF during the most turbulent decade in its history.237

235. See Mark Drajem, Richer Nations Taken to Task; JMFOfficial Cites Trade, Debt Rules, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort
Lauderdale), Sept. 29, 2000.
236. See IM- World Bank Meetings End After Violent Protests, BUSINESSWORLD (Philippines), Sept. 29, 2000.
237. See Merrill Goozner, Camdessus Submits Resignation as Head of Beleaguered IMF, CHICAGo TRIn., Nov.
10, 1999, at 8.
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